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Examining the Decline in Bargaining Power in Faculty Labor Unions in the 
United States:  
The Effects of Reduced Monopoly Power in Providing Public Higher 
Education  
 
Lynn A. Smith1 
Robert S. Balough2 
 
Our supply chain strategy has been consistent for many decades. It’s to always operate in 
the lowest cost places that we can. This allows us to use that cost advantage to invest in our 
brand, invest in innovation, and keep prices low for our consumers.3  
Abstract 
This study examines the decline in the economic power of faculty labor unions in public 
higher education in the United States in recent years. The authors assume the labor union is a 
utility maximizing entity and that income accrues to the “union family.” The union family 
attempts to maximize this income. By analyzing collective bargaining agreements and hiring 
practices between the Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties and 
the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education, the authors construct bargaining indices. 
Because this study is focused on the change in bargaining power of labor unions in public higher 
education over time, each index is constructed by looking at the ratio of the union annual income 
pay scale from the collective bargaining agreements of the mid-tier public universities in 
Pennsylvania to the average yearly income for workers in the private nonagricultural industries.  
Borrowing from the Harris-Todaro labor migration model, we construct a composite 
bargaining index where the original bargaining index is discounted by incorporating the 
proportion of part-time temporary faculty permitted by the collective bargaining agreements at 
the mid-tier public universities in Pennsylvania from 1972 to 2009. By considering the reduced 
employment of full-time tenured-tenure track faculty that can result from increased wages and 
salaries, or the increase in employment that may result from decreased wages and salaries, this 
composite bargaining index gives a better measure of the benefits accruing to the “union family” 
                                                 
1 Lynn A. Smith is Associate Professor in the Department of Economics, Clarion University of Pennsylvania.  
2 Robert S. Balough is Professor in the Department of Economics, Clarion University of Pennsylvania. 
3 Richard Noll, CEO, Hanesbrands, Inc; Also, Vernon Smith (30) made the point that the history of production and 
manufacturing has included a search for the lowest cost of production. There is much empirical evidence that 
administrations in higher education in the United States are adopting this “lowest cost” approach. 
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as faculty incomes are increasing or decreasing than would be given by our “original bargaining 
index.” 
Beginning with the early 1970s, and continuing until 2009, we find that the bargaining 
index has essentially flattened over the past ten years, and the composite bargaining index 
decreased from 1995 to 2009.  
Applying an historical perspective approach, the authors conclude that this decline in 
bargaining power in recent years came from the same sources as the declines in bargaining 
power in the private sector earlier. Namely, a reduction in monopoly power in the good or 
service offered to the buyer, substitution in the labor market, and a reduction in regulation of the 
product market. 
Introduction 
In the early days of the labor movement in the United States there was no legislation to deal 
explicitly with the issue of workers’ rights to form labor unions and to collectively bargain with 
their employer. In the absence of such legislation, the Courts generally ruled in favor of business 
when disputes between business and labor arose. For example, the Cordwainers Case in 
Philadelphia in 1806 and Commonwealth of Massachusetts v Hunt in 1842 each applied the 
Conspiracy Doctrine to rule that workers’ joining together for their own benefit was harmful to 
society. As a result, labor union membership was about six percent of the labor force prior to 
1930 (Myer; U.S. BLS). 
While the Railway Labor Act of 1926 was the first federal law to cover the collective 
bargaining process, it was not until the Great Depression of the 1930s that labor unions gained 
political power across industries nationwide. This power resulted in legislation to cover all 
workers in the private sector. Notably, the Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed in 1932 and the 
Wagner Act was passed in 1935. In large part, this legislation led to an increase in union density 
from six percent of the labor force in 1932 to about thirty-four percent by the mid-1950s. 
(Meyer; U.S.BLS).   
The desire to establish countervailing power in such industries as auto, steel, textiles, 
mining, and others characterized by high concentration levels of business was often the catalyst 
for workers to organize. Union membership data since the 1930s show that labor unions often 
located in industries where market power was the result of government regulatory agencies, e.g., 
public utilities, airlines, and other transportation industries. 
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In the years of the American labor movement after the passage of pro-labor legislation, 
labor unions often developed from the grassroots; John L. Lewis in the coal industry, Walter 
Reuther in the auto industry, I.W. Abel in steel, and Jimmy Hoffa in transportation are examples 
of individuals who organized workers in the occupations from which these organizers came.  
During the years of the Great Depression in the United States workers sought unions to 
join. Today, labor union organizers more often seek workers. This change, along with many 
other changes in society, means that contemporary labor leaders may have incentives that differ 
from their predecessors. For example, in the early years of the labor movement labor unions 
were interested in increasing wages and benefits for their members as well as improving 
conditions in the workplace; today union leaders, while they still have the incentive to increase 
wages and benefits for their members, may seek to organize workers because of the “profitable 
potential” of bringing new workers into their organizations.4  
Also, market conditions and management strategies slowly began to reduce this level of 
union density and the relatively high level of bargaining power for labor unions that was 
associated with it. 
This apparent change in the behavior of labor union leaders, management strategies, and 
market conditions forces us to re-examine the assumptions made when modeling labor unions 
and forces us to search for additional explanations for the decline of union density and union 
bargaining power in the United States. 
Traditional models usually treat a labor union as a family that is attempting to maximize 
income or to maximize utility. In a departure from this approach, Smith (Smith, L.) models the 
labor union as a “firm” attempting to maximize net revenue. In this model, the process of 
organizing workers is treated as production, which is subject to the law of diminishing returns, 
and consequently the law of increasing costs. Dues of the members represent revenue to the firm. 
Equilibrium in this model is established by the firm (entrepreneur or union leader) equating 
marginal cost of organizing with union dues paid per member – marginal revenue.  
In the model which is presented in this current study, income accrues to the “union family.” 
It is noted here that the concept of utility maximization for the faculty labor union is applied 
differently in this study than in many previous utility maximizing models for the labor union. 
Traditional models often see the labor union as selecting the optimal combination of wages and 
employment subject to the constraint of the labor demand curve generated by the employer. This 
                                                 
4 In a New York Times article - William Serrin (27) points out that union leaders targeted public employees in 
Columbus, Ohio for organization because these workers represented “profitable potential.” 
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current study treats the faculty labor union as a family that is attempting to maximize utility 
subject to the family income constraint.  
Data reported in Tables 1and  2 are consistent with the hypothesis that labor unions in 
public higher education in the United States have lost bargaining power in recent decades. Also, 
the trends in the bargaining indexes constructed from this study reported in Table 3 are 
consistent with this hypothesis. Is this apparent reduction in bargaining power due to behavior of 
the faculty labor unions, strategies of management (Sweeney), market conditions, or a 
combination of these factors?  
 
Table 1 
The Shifting Face of College Faculty 
  Full-Time   
Year % Tenured % Tenure Track % Non-Tenure % Part-Time 
1975 36.3 20.3 13.0 30.2 
1989 33.1 13.7 16.9 36.4 
2005 21.8 10.1 20.1 48.0 
The percentage of part-time faculty has steadily increased in the past three decades, 
while the percentages of full-time tenured faculty and full-time tenured track faculty 
have declined. Above data are for all U.S. degree-granting institutions.  
Sources:  
U.S. Department of Education, 1975-2005. 
“Studies Examine Impact of Part-Time College Faculty,” USA Today, Dec. 4, 2008. 
This paper offers explanations for the difficulty faculty labor unions in public higher 
education face today in securing increased salary and benefits and, in some cases, maintaining 
salary and benefit levels for their members. The explanations offered here are in addition to the 
traditional explanations given for the difficulty public sector labor unions face; for example, 
public sector unions bargain with the executive branch, while the legislative branch must provide 
the funding for the benefits negotiated by the executive branch (Davey). 
Before offering explanations for the decline in bargaining power among faculty labor 
unions in public higher education, we first will examine some empirical evidence and use as an 
example collective bargaining agreements as well as hiring practices in Pennsylvania between 
the Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties (APSCUF) and the 
Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education (PASSHE). The APSCUF faculty labor union 
was established in 1971. At that time public higher education in Pennsylvania was administered 
4
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by the Pennsylvania Department of Education. On July 1, 1983 the Pennsylvania State System of 
Higher Education was established as an entity outside the Pennsylvania Department of 
Education. According to the APSCUF Website, by 2010, APSCUF represented approximately 
6,000 faculty members in the PASSHE, which includes the fourteen state-owned universities: 
Bloomsburg; California; Cheyney; Clarion; East Stroudsburg; Edinboro; Indiana; Kutztown; 
Lock Haven; Mansfield; Millersville; Shippensburg; Slippery Rock; and West Chester 
University of Pennsylvania. For fall semester 2010, PASSHE has reported on its Website that 
119,513 full-time and part-time students were enrolled statewide  
 
Table 2 
U.S. Public Universities 2009-2010 
Academic Rank % Non-Tenure %Tenure Track % Tenured 
Professor 4.0 0.8 95.1 
Associate 6.6 7.0 86.5 
Assistant 17.3 75.6 7.1 
Instructor 87.8 10.0 2.2 
Lecturer 95.3 2.5 2.3 
No Rank 89.9 2.4 7.6 
All Combined 23.1 22.7 54.2 
 
Source:  
American Association of University Professors (26) 
 
 
Evidence of the Decline in Bargaining Power 
Because economists have long recognized the importance of cost/benefit analysis in the 
collective bargaining process between labor unions and management (Pigou; Hicks; 
Chamberlain), we incorporate this approach in developing the bargaining indices below. 
Historically, labor unions have tried to secure relatively high wages and salaries for their 
members. Because part-time temporary workers are generally paid lower wage and salary rates 
than established full-time workers, union leaders are averse to management employing part-
timers, especially when these workers are substitutes for the established full-time workers. Also, 
the employment of part-time temporary faculty means less income for the union family; 
5
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therefore a lower level of utility is available to the union family than if only full-time tenured, 
and tenure-track faculty were employed.  
 We can see this effect, in the aggregate, in Table 1.   Employment of part-time faculty in 
higher education in the United States has been on the rise in recent decades. Table 2 shows for 
the academic year 2009-2010 a high level of non-tenure track faculty employed at public 
universities in the United States. In addition to competing with lower paid colleagues for salaries, 
full-time tenure-track faculty may object to the employment of these part-time colleagues 
because the quality of education offered by the college or university will likely be reduced 
(Jaeger; Eagen).5 
With regard to Pennsylvania we can see from a review of recent collective bargaining 
agreements between APSCUF and PASSHE that the ceiling for part-time faculty has been 
increasing. In the early days of these contracts no ceilings were established with regard to part-
time temporary faculty (CBA).6 The absence of a ceiling on part-time temporary faculty suggests 
the union was not concerned about this issue in the past. 
The first language to address this issue can be found in the agreement that was in effect 
from July 1, 1990 to June 30, 1993. In each year of this contract, management agrees to employ 
5% fewer part-time temporary faculty in the current year than were hired in the previous year. 
The contract that was in effect from July 1, 1993 to June 30, 1996 is the first time the 
administration and the union agreed to set a ceiling on the employment of part-time temporary 
faculty; the ceiling was set at 7% of all faculty measured on a head count basis Although some 
exceptions were allowed, the ceiling of 7% was maintained in subsequent agreements through 
June 30, 2007. 
The most recent agreement in effect until June 30, 2011 represents a major concession by 
APSCUF on this issue.  In that agreement the ceiling was raised to 25%, and the measure used 
was changed to full-time equivalent (FTE) faculty instead of the larger head count of faculty 
members. In addition, there is a clause in the contract that is open-ended with regard to this 
ceiling provided the local APSCUF agrees. No data is available, however, to determine if any 
local exemptions have been utilized under this provision. Table 3 provides a summary of these 
ceilings on part-time faculty. 
Typically, labor unions are interested in maintaining or increasing a wage differential 
between some base wage, and the union wage. For example, some economists (Williams) 
                                                 
5 The authors of this study have shown that students’ exposure to part-time faculty significantly reduces the 
likelihood of these students completing the associate degree. 
6 We will later construct a bargaining index where we use observed part-time temporary employment of faculty. 
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maintain that labor unions support the minimum wage and increases in it because these wage 
floors will give labor unions rationale and power for increasing their own wages. We apply this 
thinking to this current topic by considering the average yearly income for workers in the private 
nonagricultural industries as the base income level for comparison by the APSCUF labor union.7 
In Table 3 we report these incomes along with the yearly incomes for the highest step full 
professor in the pay scale from the various collective bargaining agreements. The yearly private 
sector incomes were calculated from government tables, which report average weekly income. 
                                                 
7 While there could easily be debate as to which labor market to use as the base, with union density in the private 
sector holding at a very low level - about 8% according to the BLS - this selection seems reasonable. Ideally, we 
want to select the best proxy for a market equilibrium wage and then convert it to annual income. 
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Table 3 
Bargaining Indices for APSCUF 
Year Annual  Income1 - Y 
Professor  
Salary2 - Y* 
Bargaining  
Index3 P 
Composite 
Bargaining 
Index4 
1972 $7,483.32  $ 21,240.00 2.84 0 2.84 
1973 $7,944.04  $ 23,420.00 2.95 0 2.95 
1981 $13,618.28  $ 33,820.20 2.48 0 2.48 
1982 $14,200.68  $ 35,849.40 2.52 0 2.52 
1983 $14,881.36  $ 35,849.40 2.41 0 2.41 
1984 $15,496.00  $ 36,566.40* 2.36 0 2.36 
1990 $18,187.00  $ 55,997.00 3.08 0 3.08 
1991 $18,642.52  $ 59,637.20 3.20 0 3.20 
1992 $19,149.00  $ 62,171.20 3.25 0 3.25 
1993 $19,703.32  $ 65,279.80* 3.31 0.07 3.08 
1994 $20,343.64  $ 71,286.00 3.50 0.07 3.26 
1995 $20,803.64  $ 74,137.20 3.56 0.07 3.31 
1999 $24,083.80  $ 80,255.40 3.33 0.07 3.10 
2000 $25,012.52  $ 81,830.00 3.27 0.07 3.04 
2001 $25,677.08  $ 86,409.60 3.36 0.07 3.12 
2002 $26,351.00  $ 87,705.80* 3.33 0.07 3.10 
2003 $26,939.12  $ 89,907.22 3.34 0.07 3.11 
2004 $27,512.68  $ 89,907.22 3.27 0.07 3.04 
2005 $28,305.16  $ 92,604.44 3.27 0.07 3.04 
2006 $29,529.24  $ 95,382.57 3.23 0.07 3.00 
2007 $30,682.08  $ 97,767.13 3.19 0.25 2.39 
2008 $31,615.48 $100,700.14 3.19 0.25 2.39 
2009 $32,051.24 $103,721.14 3.24 0.25 2.43 
 
Definitions: 
BI = Bargaining Index – see note 3 below 
CBI = Composite Bargaining Index – see note 4 below 
 
Notes: The CBI as defined here is similar in use to the “expected wage” that we find in the 
labor migration literature and in the field of development economics. Regarding the labor 
migration model, the potential migrant will discount the wage in the market based on the 
unemployment rate. Regarding the current analysis, we must discount any measure of 
bargaining power by the fact that a faculty labor union is allowing a portion of part-time 
faculty to be employed by management. 
1 – Private nonagricultural industries in U.S. – Current $. 
2 – Annual Salary for Highest step for Full Professor – beginning in August except where 
noted; * Beginning January. 
3 – BI = Y*/Y 
4 – CBI = BI x (1 – P), where P = proportion of part-time temporary faculty permitted by 
contract. 
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From Table 3, we see the Bargaining Index (BI) for APSCUF is the ratio of the annual 
salary paid to a full professor at the highest step (Y*) to the average annual income for private 
nonagricultural industries (Y). Take note that each salary is expressed in money terms. The 
results in Table 3 illustrate an increase in this index over time, indicating – according to the 
index – an increase in bargaining power from 1972 to 2009.  In more recent times -1999 to 2009 
– this index showed a slight decrease. 
Because any reliable index to measure labor union bargaining power must include costs 
associated with raising the union wage, and because there is much concern within the labor 
movement in the United States about part-time temporary workers,8 we develop a Composite 
Bargaining Index (CBI) that includes the costs—from the union perspective—of employing 
these workers. The CBI takes the following form: 
CBI = BI x (1 – P) 
Where P is the proportion of part-time faculty permitted in the contract. This proportion is 
a ceiling. Theoretically, it has the following range: 
0 ≤ P ≤ 1 
Changes in union bargaining power are indicated in part by changes in the variable P. 
Faculty unions strongly prefer that all faculty members be full-time regular salary employees and 
these unions resist management hiring of lower paid part-time and temporary workers who are 
less likely to join and support the union. We expect, therefore, that bargaining power measured 
by BI varies inversely with P. This analysis assumes that the observed proportion of part-time 
temporary faculty employed varies directly with P. The empirical evidence does support this 
assumption. 
Under the current collective bargaining agreement between APSCUF and PASSHE—July 
1, 2007 to June 30, 2011—this proportion P is equal to 0.25. In the early days of the collective 
bargaining agreement—prior to July 1, 1993—P was effectively equal to zero.9 From the period 
July 1, 1993 to June 30, 2007, this proportion P was equal to 0.07. 
                                                 
8 The Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties has characteristics of both an industrial 
union and a craft union. Similar to an industrial union, it prefers more members to less; also, APSCUF is interested 
in expanding the size of the bargaining unit. Similar to a craft union, it prefers to have members who are highly 
skilled and highly qualified. A highly-skilled membership generally results in higher pay, because of the limited 
availability of substitute workers. 
9 We make this point, because APSCUF did not bargain for a ceiling on part-time faculty in the early contracts. 
Because APSCUF did not bargain over this issue of part-time temporary faculty, we argue that it was effectively 
zero. 
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The CBI, as it is defined in this study, is similar in application to the “expected wage” that 
we find in the labor migration literature and in the field of economic development (Harris-
Todaro). In the Harris-Todaro model, the potential migrant will discount the observed wage in 
the market based on the unemployment rate. Regarding the current analysis, the CBI adjusts the 
measure of labor union bargaining power to reflect the changing strength of the faculty labor 
union indicated by the changing maximum proportion of part-time faculty, P, that it has allowed 
under the various collective bargaining agreements with management.  This approach is 
consistent with the assumptions in the model of maximizing family income and maximizing 
family utility.  
Table 3 presents comparative data for the 1972 to 2009 period. From this table we see that 
according to the CBI there is a decline in the bargaining power of APSCUF over this period. 
From 1999 to 2009 the decline is much more pronounced. It is noted here that this study is 
concerned with the change in bargaining power over time. A cross-sectional analysis of 
bargaining power at one point in time may call for a different selection for the base income. 
Explanations for the Decline in Bargaining Power 
We now offer some explanations for the decline in bargaining power as measured by the 
bargaining indices presented above. First, the decline in union density and union bargaining 
power in general has contributed to a similar decline in faculty labor union bargaining power. 
Government has been intervening more and more in areas where labor unions once found it 
necessary to take an active role. These areas include safety on the job, pay schedules for 
overtime work, and mandatory minimum wage pay. The Fair Labor Standards Act (1938) and 
the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970) are examples of government taking roles 
away from labor unions. The recently passed health care legislation in the United States may 
result in diminished influence of labor unions nationwide because labor unions historically have 
bargained for heath benefits for their members. Second, attitudes of the population are likely to 
be a contributing factor causing the decline in labor union bargaining power in general and 
public sector bargaining power in particular. Studies by Ashenfelter-Pencavel, Smith L., and 
Lumsden-Petersen, have found evidence that attitudes of the general population influence union 
density in the United States economy. These studies have concluded that public attitudes can 
have strong influences over the outcome of labor union negotiations with management.  
While general trends in society and in politics can explain a portion of the decline in 
bargaining power of faculty labor unions in the United States in recent years, we believe that the 
dismantling of a structured master plan for public higher education in the various states has also 
contributed significantly to the reduction in bargaining power for these unions. 
10
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Today in public higher education in the United States – particularly in community colleges 
and middle-tier four-year-degree granting institutions – we see similar conditions that existed 
earlier in the private sector. Competition between and among different tiers of public higher 
education is occurring today where in a previous period the reins on mission differentiation were 
held more tightly. While industrial unions in the 1960s and 1970s first saw competition from the 
international sector, faculty labor unions in public higher education today see competition 
because of the lack of a well-defined master plan. 10 
For the past five decades, a large portion of public higher education in the United States has 
been characterized by the three-tier system developed by Clark Kerr in California in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Kerr’s ideas were put into place by the California Master Plan for Higher Education 
in 1960 (Smith, L.). This model was characterized by mission differentiation in each of three 
tiers. These three tiers were: community colleges offering associate degrees; mid-level 
universities offering undergraduate education; and research universities offering Ph. D. 
programs. The central purpose of this model was to provide the opportunity for some form of 
higher education for anyone who graduated from a high school in California. This model allowed 
children of parents who were not college graduates to have higher college participation rates than 
this group previously attained. Also, this model established public universities in California that 
competed with the most prestigious private universities in the nation. In its obituary of Clark 
Kerr, the New York Times (Hechinger) referred to his model as “an ingenious mixture of elitism 
and populism.”  
Without intention, the three-tier structure of public higher education had characteristics 
favorable to the location of faculty labor unions. Essentially, the California model is a regulated 
monopolistically competitive market for public higher education that reduces labor competition. 
Increased labor competition, however, can reduce this effect and have the same result for 
members of a faculty labor union as it had for unionized industrial workers employed in the 
private sector as discussed earlier. 
Faculty labor unions in public higher education face increased competition from the non-
unionized faculties at private colleges and universities that compete with the public institutions 
represented by these unions. Also, the increase in intra-tier competition and inter-tier competition 
                                                 
10 The state of Ohio recently adopted a master plan for public higher education, with the intent of reducing this 
competition. The Executive Summary of the Strategic Plan reads as follows - The University System of Ohio will 
end the counter-productive competition among institutions for scarce resources. The historic strengths and traditions 
of our individual universities will be drawn upon to create distinctive missions for each, leading to the establishment 
of nationally and internationally-recognized Centers of Excellence that will be drivers of both the regional and state 
economies and that will complement the comprehensive, quality education available at each institution. Each 
institution will delineate these Centers of Excellence, together with specific goals and measurements by which the 
goals can be evaluated (35). 
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in public higher education in the United States has moved it away from the traditional three-tier 
structure. In the decades that followed the 1960s, administrators in public higher education in the 
United States failed to hold the reins on mission differentiation as Kerr had advised. This mission 
creep led to a proliferation of multi-level academic program offerings at many public higher 
education institutions, which is now the norm rather than the exception. Today we find 
community colleges offering four-year programs, traditional undergraduate institutions offering 
associate degree programs in competition with community colleges, and graduate research 
universities establishing branch campuses that offer two and four-year degree programs in direct 
competition with community colleges and traditional four-year institutions. 
This increased competition manifests itself in other ways as well. For example, the non-
union Pennsylvania State University has 25 branch campuses in Pennsylvania outside its main 
campus in University Park. Nineteen of these campuses now offer four year degree programs, 
while the erstwhile mission of these campuses was to serve as feeder campuses to the main 
campus primarily serving students for their first two years. This changing mission places these 
nineteen campuses of Penn State University in direct competition with the fourteen institutions 
of the unionized Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education. Enrollment data from fall 2010 
reveal that 33,997 students attend these nineteen campuses. Five of the six remaining Penn State 
branch campuses are either professional or graduate schools. The sixth is a community-technical 
college – Pennsylvania College of Technology, in Williamsport – which offers both associate 
degrees and bachelor degrees. 11      
While The Pennsylvania State University is eager to announce that it is a top-tier research 
university and a member of the Big Ten athletic conference, it has at the same time broadened its 
mission to include associate degree programs in its curriculum offerings.  
This proliferation of the diversification of mission of these institutions has increased 
competition among these institutions. Faculty bargaining power at the traditional four-year 
institution – where many of the faculty labor unions are located - is eroded by this competition. 
In contrast to this situation, consider public sector police and fire departments. No similar 
competition exists and a type of monopoly results in the supply of labor services by unions to 
police and fire departments. Consequently the unions representing these public service workers 
may have lost bargaining power for other reasons discussed in this paper but they have faced no 
erosion of bargaining power because of increased competition from other workers. While 
competition from the international sector weakened industrial labor unions earlier, the 
                                                 
11 A similar situation has evolved in the Wisconsin system. According to Dr. Petro Roter, Vice Chancellor for 
Student Affairs at the University of Wisconsin – Oshkosh, some traditional four-year degree campuses in the 
University of Wisconsin system are now offering Ph.D. programs, and community colleges in this system are now 
offering baccalaureate degrees. 
12
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dismantling of the Kerr model has had a similar effect on faculty labor unions in public higher 
education today. 
In the United States in recent years, more capital-for-labor substitution has occurred in 
higher education similar to the capital-for-labor substitution in the manufacturing sector in the 
past several decades. Distance education, such as web-based online courses, interactive 
television courses, and increased class sizes facilitated by large high-technology classrooms are 
all examples of this trend toward increased capital intensity. The impact of this increased capital 
utilization on union strength in higher education is the same as the impact in the industrial sector 
in prior decades.  
The equivalent to service sector outsourcing to reduce labor costs that has occurred in 
recent years in many service industries is also occurring in higher education.  Articulation 
agreements between four-year degree granting universities, and community colleges results in 
some “production” being outsourced to low-cost labor in the community colleges because 
students can take credits with guaranteed transferability to four-year programs from community 
colleges. We can expect that the impact of this form of outsourcing on faculty union bargaining 
strength at four-year colleges and universities to be similar to the impact of outsourcing on 
private sector union strength mentioned above. This type of outsourcing has occurred in other 
public sector settings as well. Private non-union companies competing for contracts to provide 
social services, prison guards, and janitorial services to state and local governmental units are 
examples. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In summary, this paper has proposed two possible measures of public-sector union 
bargaining power and provides evidence of a decline in bargaining power for organized faculty 
in Pennsylvania. An explanation of the existence of this decline in spite of stable union density is 
offered with several possible causes each with a direct corollary to a contributing factor in the 
decline in industrial union bargaining power in the United States. First, the increased competition 
faculty labor unions are now experiencing from the dismantling of the California three-tier 
model espoused by Clark Kerr is similar to the increased competition U.S. manufacturing faced 
from the international sector. Second, the increased use of capital intensive teaching techniques 
including distance education and web-based courses, and increased class sizes facilitated by 
large high-technology classrooms is similar to capital-for-labor substitution in the manufacturing 
sector. Third, outsourcing has occurred in both manufacturing and in public higher education. 
Outsourcing work to non-union companies in the private sector is similar to the effect of 
articulation agreements in higher education that outsource work to lower-cost educational 
institutions. Lastly, the increased use of part-time and temporary employees, common in both 
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manufacturing and public higher education, has moved work from regular union members to 
lower-cost workers enjoying weaker benefits and job security and has weakened bargaining 
power of unions in both areas. 
While public sector unions have fared far better than their private sector counterparts due 
primarily to the maintenance of union density, the loss in bargaining power of unions has, 
nonetheless been widespread and universal and there is no indications that this trend is slowing. 
It is more likely that the competition faced by public sector unions will increase in the future as 
governments attempt to control costs and balance budgets.  
It is also more likely that capitalization and use of labor-saving technologies will increase 
in the near future for public sector employment. Just as larger class sizes facilitated by enhanced 
use of technologies is the most likely scenario for higher education, new technologies are just as 
likely to reduce or eliminate the demand for highway toll-takers. Increased use of technology and 
capital-intensive production techniques cut both ways, however. Weakened union bargaining 
power overall and fewer union workers is often accompanied by increased earnings due to the 
increased productivity resulting from the use of capital and technology intensive production 
techniques. 
Outsourcing may or may not continue to grow in the future. Private companies can often 
compete for outsourced public sector jobs because of lower labor cost due to a lower level of 
benefits offered to their employees, particularly health care coverage and pension benefits. The 
recent passage of the Affordable Health Care Act in the United States may actually mitigate the 
practice of outsourcing, at least at the domestic level in the public sector. Outsourcing services 
overseas is usually not a viable option with public sector service jobs as it often is with private 
sector service jobs. The advantage private sector competition has over public sector employment 
regarding pension costs may also be mitigated over time as more state and local governments 
have taken actions to bring pension costs under control. 
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